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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is threefold: Firstly, we propose a systemic view of 
communication based in autopoiesis, the theory of living systems formulated by 
Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987). Secondly, we show the links between the 
underpinning assumptions of autopoiesis and the sociolinguistic approaches of 
Halliday (1978), Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995), and Lemke (1995, 1998). Thirdly, we 
propose a theoretical and analytical synthesis of autopoiesis and sociolinguistics for 
the study of organisational communication. 
In proposing a systemic theory for organisational communication, we argue that 
traditional approaches to communication, information, and the role of language in 
human organisations have, to date, been placed in teleological constraints because of 
an inverted focus on organisational purpose - the generally perceived role of an 
organisation within society - that obscure, rather than clarify, the role of language 
within human organisations.  
We argue that human social systems are, according to the criteria defined by 
Maturana and Varela, third-order, non-organismic living systems constituted in 
language. We further propose that sociolinguistics provides an appropriate analytical 
tool which is both compatible and penetrating in synthesis with the systemic 
framework provided by an autopoietic understanding of social organisation.  
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The theoretical framework of autopoiesis: key terms and definitions  
Maturana and Varela (1980) argue that the presence of autopoietic organisation1 - or 
self-producing processes - within a system is both necessary and sufficient to classify 
the system as living. The relevance of autopoiesis to communication theory lies in 
Maturana and Varela’s assertion that human beings’ autopoiesis is made possible 
within an interrelated network of social environments that, in their view, are 
recursively created, coordinated, and maintained through the use of language (cf. 
Maturana & Varela 1980, 1987). 
Autopoietic systems are ‘self-making’ systems ‘defined as unities through the basic 
circularity of their production of their components’ (Maturana & Varela 1980: xiv, 
our italics). Maturana and Varela assert that ‘autopoiesis is necessary and sufficient to 
characterize the organization of living systems’ (1980: xviii). In other words, if it can 
be shown that an entity has a self-producing organisation, it is recognised as a ‘living 
system’ (1980: 9-11; 82-84). From this perspective, Maturana and Varela point out 
that ‘purpose, function or goal are unnecessary and misleading’ concepts when 
classifying a system as ‘living’, the only consideration being whether or not the 
system’s internal organisation is oriented to the reproduction of its own unity (1980: 
xix, 85-86).  
A unity is an ‘entity’ which is ‘distinct from a background’ or environment (Maturana 
& Varela 1980: xviii; 96). Maturana and Varela differentiate between a ‘composite 
unity’ which has processes of organisation associated with its structure, and a ‘simple 
unity’ which ‘only has the [physical] properties with which it is endowed by the 
operation of distinction’ (1980: xx). The identification of various unities through the 
process of distinction is defined by Maturana and Varela as the ‘basic cognitive 
operation’ that humans perform as observers (1980: xix). Systemic cognition is 
intrinsic to Maturana and Varela’s theory because of the need for continual 
distinctions to be made by a system between itself and its environment (1980: 9). 
Maturana and Varela argue that cognition is, therefore, an emergent property of any 
living system (1980: 8-11). 
The organisation of a particular kind of system consists of the ‘relations between 
components’ that define the system’s typology (1980: xix-xx). Therefore, it is the 
relatedness of systemic components, rather than the components themselves, that 
identify a particular system as being distinct from, or similar to, others (1980: xix-xx). 
To exemplify: While people share similar self-producing biological processes, each 
person is physically unique. 
Social systems are defined by Maturana and Varela as third-order autopoietic systems 
which arise as a result of structural coupling among second-order, metacellular living 
systems such as insects or people (1980: 107-108). Structural coupling occurs when 
structural changes are triggered - not determined - in living systems ‘whenever there is 
a history of recurrent interactions leading to a structural congruence between two (or 
more) systems’ (Maturana & Varela 1987: 75), including interactions between a 
system and its environment (Maturana & Varela 1980: xx-xxi; 102-107; 1897: 39-46; 
Luhmann 1995: 55; Allen & Sanglier 1980). The result of structural coupling for any 
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system, according to Maturana and Varela, ‘will be a history of mutual congruent2 
structural changes as long as the autopoietic unity and its environment do not 
disintegrate’ (1980: 107-111; 1987: 75). Maturana and Varela argue that systemic 
changes caused by structural coupling may exceed the limits of a unity’s 
organisational boundaries. If the limits of self-organisation are exceeded, either the 
‘system loses its identity and becomes something else, a unity defined by another 
organisation’, or disintegrates (1980: xx-xxi). Structural couplings and resultant 
systemic changes within human social systems occur in the linguistic domain 
(Maturana and Varela 1987: 206-235).  
The linguistic domain is the domain of all linguistic behaviours within a typology of 
systems, (1987: 209). Maturana and Varela associate, but differentiate, among social 
phenomena, communicative behaviours, linguistic behaviours, and language (1987: 
209). Social phenomena are ‘those phenomena associated with the participation of 
organisms in constituting third-order unities’ and are common to third-order unities 
formed by any metacellular organisms (1987: 193-195).  
Communicative behaviours are ‘coordinated behaviours mutually triggered among 
members of a social unity’ (1987: 193). According to Maturana and Varela, ‘there is 
no “transmitted information” in communication’ (1987: 196). Rather, ‘communication 
takes place each time there is coordinated behaviour in a realm of structural coupling’ 
(1987: 196). Maturana and Varela argue that communicative behaviours orient 
participants’ behaviours to each other, or to the environment, by invoking a co-
ontogeny, a meeting and mixing of subjective realities based on similar sensations of 
a world “out there” (1987: 180-196). The co-ontogenous view of communication 
forms the basis of autopoietic epistemological and ontological assumptions: Rather 
than taking the view - as does Bateson’s (1979) model of cognition - of the mind as a 
cognitive entity that manipulates coded representations of a knowable, objective, 
independently existing reality, Maturana and Varela assert that it is the way people 
see, classify, describe, and relate with each other and their environment that creates 
linguistically described, socially shared understandings of an ultimately unknowable 
world (Capra 1996: 278-288; 297-300; Maturana & Varela 1980: 115-123). 
Maturana and Varela view linguistic behaviours as meta-communicative in that they 
coordinate communicative behaviours and, therefore, social phenomena (1987: 229-
230). They argue that, because of the apparent integratedness of the human linguistic 
and cognitive domains, the concepts of ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ must be included 
as integral to the human domain of language (1987: 231). The cognitive domain of 
humans iteratively observes, defines, creates, and coordinates the social, 
communicative, and linguistic domains in which individuals realise their autopoiesis 
(1987: 231). Maturana and Varela summarise this concept by saying that:  
in the network of linguistic interactions in which we move, we maintain an ongoing 
descriptive recursion which we call the “I”. It enables us to conserve our linguistic 
operational coherence and our adaptation in the domain of language (1987: 231, 
original italics).  
Maturana and Varela specify the social domain of language as the environment in 
which humans constitute their autopoiesis, that is, their autonomy3 and identity; their 
recursively self-described “I” (1987: 231). According to Maturana and Varela, 
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language is unique to humans4 and differs from linguistic behaviour - such as that 
displayed by birds - insofar as language allows humans to reflexively coordinate their 
own linguistic behaviour (1987: 211). 
To proscribe traditional understandings of systemic purpose, Maturana and Varela 
differentiate between the autopoietic - or self-producing - processes of the living 
system and its allopoietic processes: A system’s autopoietic organisation is enclosed 
within its boundaries and is concerned solely with the system’s maintenance and 
iterative reconstitution of itself as an identity, while its allopoietic processes are those 
that produce something other than the system itself (Maturana & Varela 1980: 77-78). 
As a demonstration of the difference between allopoietic and autopoietic processes, 
assume - hypothetically for the moment - that the Ford company is autopoietic. The 
ostensible purpose of the Ford company is the transformation of various materials into 
cars. The production of cars is an allopoietic process of the Ford organisation because 
the Ford car-making process produces something other than the organisation itself 
and, as such, is incidental to our theoretical approach. The Ford company also 
continually recreates the Ford company as a recognisable entity within society. The 
processes that maintain the Ford company as a distinct identity may be viewed as a 
function of its autopoiesis. According to Maturana and Varela, human social systems 
are constituted in language, as is the human concept of identity (1987: 231). This 
being the case, we assert that a sociolinguistic analysis of linguistic phenomena is the 
most appropriate analytical tool in understanding the systemic, self-producing, self-
maintaining, and self-organising role of language in the human social system. Also, as 
Varela (1992) points out, in studying the cognitive processes of living systems, ‘[w]e 
are forced to discover “regions” that interweave in complex manners, and, in the case 
of humans, that extend beyond the strict confines of the body into the socio-linguistic 
register’ (1992: 14). 
From a sociolinguistic perspective, Fairclough (1992) acknowledges the constitutive 
role of language in the systemically constructed identity of individuals noting that: 
… the identity function of language begins to assume great importance, because the 
ways in which societies categorize and build identities for their members is a 
fundamental aspect of how they work, how power relations are imposed and 
exercized, [and] how societies are reproduced and changed (1992: 168).  
Consistent with Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995) and Lemke (1995), we argue that 
human social systems are themselves unities that can be identified by the ways in 
which their members describe “the world”, and by the way in which they themselves 
are described. We assert that social systems are living systems that survive and 
reproduce discursively in social environments which they mutually and iteratively 
specify, and are specified by, in the social domain of language.  
Social systems and systems theories: Criticisms, failures, and misunderstandings 
Academic criticism of systems theorising, particularly in the context of sociology, is 
exemplified in the words of Lilienfeld (1978) who says: 
Systems thinkers exhibit a fascination for definition, conceptualizations, and 
programmatic statements of a vaguely benevolent, vaguely moralising nature … They 
collect analogies between the phenomena of one field and those of another … the 
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descriptions of which seem to offer them an esthetic delight that is its own 
justification … No evidence that systems theory has been used to achieve the 
solution of any substantive problem in any field whatsoever has appeared (Lilienfeld 
1978: 191-192). 
At the time Lilienfeld wrote on the ideology of systems theory, several systemic 
theoretical approaches focusing on the concept of self-organisation, besides the theory 
of autopoiesis, were developed (Capra 1996: 78; Zeleny 1980; Janstch 1980). These 
include: dissipative structures (Prigogine 1980); laser theory (Haken 1985, quoted in 
Capra 1996: 91); and autocatalysis, hypercycles, and ultracycles (Jantsch 1980, Capra 
1996: 88). We will briefly describe the basis of these theories to provide a context for 
the purpose of validating, to some degree, Lilienfeld’s critique of ideologically driven 
systems theorists in the context of proliferating misapplications of complex systems 
theories in sociological fields. In contrast, we will also argue that valid applications of 
systems theories are possible in the areas to which they apply. 
Briefly, the theory of dissipative structures is based on far-from-equilibrium chemical 
reactions which produce order from instability under extreme thermodynamic stress, 
thus negating the thermodynamic law of entropy which, in opposition to the behaviour 
of these chemical reactions, posits a universe that tends inexorably towards 
thermodynamic disorder (cf. Capra 1996; Prigogine 1980, 1997). Prigogine’s 
mathematical formulations of the behaviour in dissipative structures is attributed as 
the foundations upon which Chaos (Gleick 1987; Prigogine 1997) and Complexity 
(Arthur 1995) theories are based. Chaos and Complexity theories are non-linear5 
mathematical descriptors that have generated multi-disciplinary metaphors which are 
most usually - to paraphrase Lilienfeld - mere analogies that are justified by their 
aesthetic appeal alone (1978: 192).  
Alan Sokal, professor of physics at New York University stresses that Complexity 
theory ‘is in a very inchoate stage, even as pure mathematics’ and contends that ‘its 
supposed "applications" to social phenomena usually seem to amount to nothing more 
than pasting trendy metaphors over banal ideas’ (email correspondence, May 15 
1998). Sokal’s position on Chaos is less scathing but warns that ‘chaos theory (i.e. the 
theory of nonlinear dynamics) is rather well developed mathematically, but to apply it 
in a sensible way to a concrete physical, biological or social system requires a fair 
knowledge of the equations that govern the system –something that is usually not 
fulfilled in social systems’ (email correspondence, May 15 1998, original emphasis). 
The mathematics of Chaos and Complexity may be useful as retrospectively applied 
analytical tools for complex systems behaviour, they do not, however - as Prigogine 
himself acknowledges - provide predictors for how a system will react in a future 
situation (Prigogine 1997: 109).  
Similarly, autocatalysis, a pre-biological theory of chemical self-reproduction (Jantsch 
1980), and Haken’s (1983) laser theory (quoted in Capra 1996: 89-92), which is based 
on the self-organising behaviour of quanta6 in extreme conditions, may provide 
enchanting metaphors for complex social behaviour, but cannot seriously be 
considered as social theories unless one assumes that the behaviour of human beings 
is similar to that of thermodynamically distended chemical compounds, pre-biological 
chemical reactions, or unusually coherent collections of light particles. While these 
theories may provide useful statistical tools, none, at least in our view, provide an 
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appropriate basis for social theory. Nevertheless, many prognosticating social and 
organisational theorists suggest that Chaos and Complexity provide sound bases from 
which to theorise about sociology (Arthur 1995; Bella 1997; Gell-Mann 1994; Gunter 
1995; Janstch 1980; Kauffmann 1996; Latham 1998, 201-201; Mulgan 1997: 3; 
Stacey 1995; Rough 1997; Youngblood 1997).  
While certain Complexity social theorists, such as Janstch (1980), and Capra (1996) 
are benign or idealistic in their theoretical applications, we contend that much of the 
theorising that goes under the heading of complex systems theory, especially in the 
areas of management and organisational communication, takes the form of sophistry 
that legitimises structural amorality. Take, for instance, Bella’s (1997) assertion that 
complex systems theory largely divests the tobacco industry of culpability in 
deceiving the public about the dangers of tobacco: 
Leaked documents and public testimony point to widespread distortion of 
information within the tobacco industry. The model describes such behaviors as 
emergent outcomes not reducible to or sufficiently explained by individual fraud and 
deliberate deceit. Critics of the tobacco industry often fail to appreciate the role of 
self-organization in complex systems. They presume rational design. Consequently, 
they imply more intentional deceit, deliberate planning, and conspiracy needed to 
explain the distortions that actually occurred. The tobacco industry expresses general 
phenomena found in many large-scale human systems … They are self-organizing 
(Bella 1997: 977-978). 
Bella’s sophistry is, unfortunately, somewhat typical of sociological complex systems 
theorising, especially in the areas of management and organisational communication. 
Bella’s agenda is transparent and exemplifies Sokal’s criticism of current applications 
of Complexity theory in sociology. Bella also indicates the direction in which a pre-
biological view of human behaviour might take sociological theory. 
Positioning autopoiesis within the field of sociology 
As a sociological theory, autopoiesis has been widely interpreted (Beer 1981 1985; 
Capra 1996; Goudsmit 1992; Luhmann 1995; Mingers 1995a; 1995b; 1996; Mulgan 
1997: 180-181; Whittaker 1998; Zeleney 1980). The unusual way in which Maturana 
and Varela express their theory may partially explain the divergence in its 
interpretation. Maturana and Varela deliberately describe their theory using ‘a new 
language’ and, as a result, widely divergent interpretations of autopoiesis are 
inevitable (Maturana & Varela 1980: xiii). Under-reading of autopoiesis may lead to 
an a view of autopoiesis as merely an elaboration of entelechy7. Such an under-reading 
leads - at best - to a continued inversion of systemic teleology, and at worst, the basis 
for questionable social policy. Geoff Mulgan (1997), founder of the British think-tank, 
Demos, writes in favour of a minimalist role for government:  
[S]ince distributed intelligence means distributed responsibility, culpability, and 
worry … it would embody at each scale the principles of reciprocity that I have 
argued are the basis of modern social orders. The philosophical idea that best 
expresses this ideal of a self-organising society is autopoiesis, or self-creation, one of 
the most potent themes in contemporary systems thinking … They [Maturana and 
Varela] argued that rather than thinking of systems in relation to an external 
environment we should see them as autonomous, circular and self-referential, 
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primarily concerned with their own organisation and identity (Mulgan 1997: 180-
181). 
Here, Mulgan, for whatever reason, ignores the domain-specific phenomenology that 
Maturana and Varela specify as central to interpretating their theory (cf. Maturana & 
Varela 1980; 1987). Mulgan’s interpretation also ignores the fundamental premise of 
autopoiesis: the intrinsic cognitive relationship between an autopoietic system and its 
environment. Put simply, Mulgan confuses the autopoietic attributes of a single cell - 
a first-order autopoietic system - with those of a second-order, metacellular system, 
such as a person, while completely ignoring all attributes of third-order autopoietic 
systems including the fundamental property of third-order systems which is, that an 
autopoietic social system provides the environment in which its constituents realise 
their autonomy. Furthermore, Maturana and Varela specify that a system can be 
identified only in relationship to its environment (Allen & Sanglier 1980; Luhmann 
1995: 55; Maturana & Varela 1980: xx-xxi; 102-107; 1897: 39-46; Zeleny 1980). 
Because these tenets are intrinsic to autopoietic systems, we assert that Mulgan’s 
reading of autopoiesis is ill-informed.  
Among autopoietic social theorists, communication features most prominently in the 
works of Luhmann (1995) and Mingers (1995a, 1995b, 1996)8. In comparing 
Maturana’s (1988, in Mingers 1996) theory of social autopoiesis with Giddens’ (1979, 
1984, in Mingers 1995) structuration theory, Mingers agrees that autopoiesis may 
provide an abstract basis for a sociological theory of communication (1996: 470). 
However, he argues that ‘there are fundamental difficulties involved in such an 
application’ (1996: 470). Mingers puts forward his reasoning for this assertion: 
Generally, people can choose to belong or not to belong to particular institutions, and 
will be members of many at any time. What is it that would constitute the boundaries 
of such [social] systems and, moreover, how can it be said that such institutions act 
as unities –is it not only individual people who act? (1996: 470).  
We contend that Mingers’ rationale is convoluted in the context of autopoiesis: 
Mingers inverts the role of observer and unity by specifying the unity as an actor 
rather than as an observable entity that is ‘distinct from a background’ (Maturana & 
Varela 1980: xx-xix). That is to say, if an autopoietic unity is distinguishable - if it has 
an observable identity - it need not act in any particular manner other than that which 
maintains its unity or identity (Maturana & Varela 1987: 75; 1980: 107-111). 
Furthermore, we find Mingers’ argument against a non-metaphoric view of social 
autopoiesis to be naive in the context of sociological and communication theories. He 
concedes, however, that an autopoietic social system ‘might consist of concepts, or 
descriptions, or communications which interact and self-produce’ (1996: 471). 
Mingers acknowledges Luhmann’s (1995) interpretation of social autopoiesis noting 
that Luhmann’s theory ‘specifies communication as the basic component’ (1996: 
471). Mingers concludes that, theoretically, Giddens and Maturana, are similar but 
incompatible in their assumptions (1996: 478-479). In summary, Mingers’ takes a 
deterministic, realist standpoint to negate the validity of social autopoiesis:  
The problem is to determine unambiguously the nature of the components, the 
production processes, and the autopoietic relations of such a system. Maturana, 
himself, does not claim that social systems are autopoietic, but that they are a 
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medium for the interaction of autopoietic systems under conditions of mutual 
acceptance (1996: 479).    
Mingers’ mechanistic assessment of social autopoiesis appears to suit his purposes as 
an Information Systems (IS) theorist9 but is not helpful in the debate about social 
autopoiesis other than to highlight the impracticalities of imputing social autopoiesis 
from a deterministic, realist (Mingers 1995b: 293) standpoint.  
The role of language in human social systems 
Mingers’ concerns about social autopoiesis are easily addressed from the discursive 
perspective of sociolinguistics (cf. Fairclough 1989; Halliday 1978; Lemke 1995; 
McKenna 1997; van Dijk 1994): Social unities may be identified as discourse 
communities (Lemke 1995: 41; McKenna 1997; van Dijk 1994), or, in the language of 
autopoiesis, consensual domains (Luhmann 1995: 81; Maturana & Varela 1980: 137; 
1987: 207-212; Mingers 1995a: 36; 1996: 480). Lemke, drawing on Bakhtin’s 
(1929/1986, in Lemke 1995: 22) theory of ‘intertextuality’, asserts that a discourse 
community can be identified by the way it describes the world and its interactions 
because ‘[e]ach community, each discourse tradition, has its own canons of 
intertextuality10, its own principles and customs regarding which texts are most 
relevant to the interpretation of any one text’ (1995: 41). Sociolinguistics examines: 
• How language is used to construct things in the natural or social domains by their 
‘explicit descriptions as participants, processes, relations and circumstances 
standing in particular semantic relations to one another’;  
• How the discourse community orients itself attitudinally to others, and to the 
presentational content of its own discourse, and; 
• The organisational11 ‘construction of relations between elements of the discourse 
itself’ (Lemke 1995: 41).  
From this sociolinguistic, discursive perspective, Mingers’ questions about the 
constitution of social boundaries, social components, social production processes, the 
autopoietic relations of social systems, and their social reproduction (van Dijk 1994: 
109) are answered. In defining the role of language in a discourse community, 
Killingsworth and Gilbertson encapsulate the concept of social autopoiesis as a 
function of discursive practices ‘by which communities develop and advance their 
agendas of action12, build solidarity, patrol and extend their boundaries, and perpetuate 
themselves in the life of a general culture’ (Killingsworth and Gilbertson, quoted in 
McKenna 1997: 191). In other words, a sociolinguistic discourse approach is 
consistent with the fundamental tenets of the linguistic and communicative behaviours 
specified by an autopoietic social theory of communication, and with Maturana and 
Varela’s description of the cognitive relationship between the system and its 
environment (Mingers 1995: 17; Maturana & Varela 1980: 48-50; van Dijk 1994).  
An autopoietic and sociolinguistic theory of self-organising, self-describing social 
entities necessarily extends to view the effects of a discourse community’s social 
environment upon its own descriptions about itself and vice versa (Lemke 1995: 37-
39; Maturana & Varela 1980: 48-50; van Dijk 1994: 110). Lemke asserts that, within 
a discourse community, ‘thematic patterns … recur from text to text in slightly 
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different wordings, but [are] recognisably the same, and can be mapped onto a generic 
semantic pattern that is the same for all’ texts about a particular theme (1995: 42, 
original italics). This being the case, Lemke’s discourse theory provides a useful tool 
by which to analyse the self-descriptions, and, therefore, the organisational aspects, of 
a discourse community (Lemke 1995: 99-105; Maturana & Varela 1987: 211).  
We hypothesise that the consistency between systemically produced descriptions of 
“the world” and the system, and the descriptions produced by individual constituents 
of the social system - or discourse community - will be directly related to the degree 
that the social system facilitates the autonomy or autopoiesis of its constituents. Put 
simply, we hypothesise that the higher the degree of consistency between systemically 
produced descriptions and individually produced descriptions, the more likely it is that 
a particular discourse community will maintain an ongoing identity within society. 
Organisational communication, autopoiesis, and sociolinguistics: A synthesis 
Recent theorising about organisational communication indicates that it remains, both 
in respect of focus and practice, an ill-defined discipline that is influenced largely by 
trends in management theory (Johnson 1990; Dixon 1996a 1996b, Hawkins 1997; 
Herschel & Andrews 1997; Kendall 1997; Morley, Shockley & Cesaria 1997; 
Ngwenyama & Lee 1997; Page 1997, Paul & Strbiak 1997). Hawkins’ (1997) 
Organisational culture: Sailing between evangelism and complexity, gives an 
exhaustive account of historical and current trends in organisational theorising from 
the Taylorist view of the organisation-as-machine; to the Parsonian, organisation-as-
organism view of organising; to an anthropological and cultural view; to 
psychological and cognitive approaches; to current trends in theories of individual and 
organisational complexity, including the outlandish quantum-cognitive approach; to 
postmodern theories of organisational change management. Although Hawkins’ 
history emphasises the systemic and social nature of organisational communication, it 
provides no definitive understanding of how organisational communication might best 
be understood other than as ‘a fascinating field and a discipline fraught with academic 
and methodological complexity’ (Hawkins 1997: 431).  
The uncritical acceptance by management theorists of the assumption that 
communicating and cultivating ‘one shared vision’ within the enterprise is both 
possible and desirable results, as Hawkins notes, in proliferating and oversimplified 
sets of ‘homilies and commandments’ that do little to reveal the dynamic nature of 
competing discourses within the enterprise based social system (1997: 418). From a 
critical perspective, we argue that these proliferating, simplistic theories of 
organisational communication represent a conservative reflex to the indeterminacy 
specified by the ascendance of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in poststructuralist 
sociology, and complex systems theorising in the fields of physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics. The pseudo-scientific posturing of traditional managerial rationalism, 
exemplified in the complex theorising of Bella (1997), are consistent with Saul’s 
(1992) assertion that such posturings typify the conservative tradition of so-called 
rational management, both in business and politics:  
The creation of contemporary government elites has followed the same course as that 
of the new business elites. The phenomenon has different superficial characteristics, 
but the underlying theme is identical … [T]he trend began with the growth of the 
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social sciences, which forced the full array of of real social questions into a falsely 
scientific straightjacket. The postwar schools of political science and economics are a 
prime example, with their reliance on abstract models, flowcharts, and impenetrable 
specialist dialects. Apart from being indescribably boring, they have been almost 
flawlessly wrong on every issue they have addressed (1992: 123). 
As Bella (1997) and Mulgan (1997) demonstrate, the indeterminacy of sociological 
and physical sciences, rather than subverting the historically seamless rationalist 
discourse within the fields of management and political theorising, provides a 
platform from which such pseudo-scientific managerialism divests itself of 
responsibility for systemic outcomes. Furthermore, uncritical complex systems 
theorising provides a new dimension of structural amorality in which conservative 
rationalism flourishes. Gee and Lankshear (1995) emphasise the imperative to 
critically analyse discourses that require the constituency of a ‘complex system’ to 
‘simply align itself with the values, visions, and practices of fast capitalism’ (1995: 
10). 
We argue for a synthesis of autopoietic and sociolinguistic methodological lenses that 
filter out these traditionally accepted notions of enterprise based systemic purpose. 
While acknowledging the subjectivity of meaning, Dixon’s (1996a, Chap. 7; 1996b) 
perception of systemic purpose exemplifies the traditionally perceived relationship 
between organisational communication and organisational purpose: That is, that well-
managed organisational communication provides a unifying ‘vision’ for its members, 
thus bringing greater efficiency to the enterprise (Dixon 1996, Chap. 7). Regardless of 
how subjective an account of organisational communication is conveyed in the 
context of traditional understandings of systemic purpose, we argue that a focus on the 
alignment of individual goals to organisational goals through such instruments as 
vision, purpose, or mission statements, participatively produced or otherwise, is 
epistemologically and ontologically mechanistic because, regardless of how the 
language is couched, the individual is necessarily viewed as a functional object in the 
context of ‘one organisational purpose’ (Dixon 1996a: 76). Such understandings of 
human social systems provide little insight into the making of abstract organisational 
meaning.  
An autopoietic view of social systems specifies teleologically driven understandings 
of social systems as allopoietically focused and, therefore, largely irrelevant to the 
processes that maintain individual and organisational identities, both internally and 
externally of the system (cf. Luhmann 1995; Maturana & Varela 1980: 77-78). 
Viewed through the lens of autopoiesis, organisational communication is the means 
by which a socially embedded discourse community maintains its identity; the means 
by which its individual constituents understand “the world” and themselves through 
descriptive discourse; and the means by which convergent and divergent relationships 
between the organisation and its constituent individuals are produced, maintained, and 
altered - dialogically and dialectically - through the use of language. 
Theorists from a range of disciplines argue that human social systems, from 
interpersonal relationships (Pask 1992: 228, Vandamme 1992: 97-98; van Dijk 1994: 
109) to the global society (Luhmann 1995: 262-271; Vandamme 1992: 97) are 
observing (Vandamme 1992: 97; van Dijk 1994), cognitive (Garud & Rappa 1996; 
van Dijk 1994), self-observing (Phillips 1996: 476; van Dijk 1994), self-producing 
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(Luhmann 1995: 406, van Dijk 1994), self-describing entities (Gioia, Thomas, Clark, 
& Chittipeddi 1996: 238; Maturana & Varela 1987: 211; Pask 1992: 227), and so may 
be described as autopoietic. If we assume, as Maturana and Varela do, that the 
presence of systemic autopoiesis is sufficient to define the system as living, the 
question of whether a social system can be classified as a living system is confirmed. 
As Lemke emphasises: ‘an ecosocial13 system is an ecosystem’ (1995: 119, original 
emphasis) with all the features of semogenesis14 that this entails (Lemke 1998).  
Human social systems present a unique case in that the autonomy of the individual 
within a given social system is based in linguistic descriptions of what it means to be 
an individual in that system (Aristotle 1962/1981: 246; Brown & Isaacs 1997; Pask 
1992; Vandamme 1992; Hacking 1996, Luhmann 1995: 139-174; Tambiah 1996: 47-
48). Historically, metaphors of that which constitutes knowledge of life itself also 
generate metaphoric descriptions of the living organisation (Aristotle 1962/1981: 246; 
Bronowski 1973: 221-234; Dixon 1996a: 78; 1996b: 69-70; Hawkins 1997; Rough 
1997; Tambiah 1996: 47-49; van Dijk 1994: 114-117; Zeleny 1980). A Newtonian 
clockwork understanding of life creates mechanistic, reductionist, deterministic 
metaphors of the living system as a machine-like organism composed of functional, 
analysable parts, and which is made primarily to produce something other than itself 
(Allen & Sanglier 1980; Hawkins 1997; Tambiah 1996: 47-49; Zeleny 1980). An 
autopoietic systems view offers an alternative, non-organismic understanding of the 
living organisation as a third-order autopoietic system in which its constituents realise 
their autonomy (Maturana & Varela 1987: 107-108). Sociolinguistics offers a socially 
contextualised way to study how language is used to maintain and redefine the 
boundaries, behaviours, and power relations within the autopoietic social system. We 
propose that a theoretical synthesis of autopoiesis and sociolinguistics provides a 
comprehensive and parsimonious, systemic, analytical lens for the study of 
organisational communication.  
Philosophical implications of the theoretical framework 
Autopoiesis rests upon specific teleological, epistemological, ontological, 
phenomenological, and cognitive15 assumptions. Maturana has been criticised for 
invoking the epistemic fallacy of confusing or collapsing the nature of knowing with 
the nature of being (Mingers 1995a: 115). However, we believe that both Maturana 
and Varela have carefully considered their stance in respect of the epistemological and 
ontological aspects of their theory. They argue that the common biological roots of 
human beings predispose them to particular ways of knowing thereby limiting their 
knowledge of what “is”. Thus, according to Maturana and Varela, the philosophical 
issues of knowing and being are inextricably linked to the biologically limited access 
that humans have to “the world”. This being the case, Maturana and Varela argue that 
humans, perhaps mistakenly, attribute one or more purposes to living systems by 
unquestioningly viewing systemic behaviour from an anthropocentric, teleologically 
causal standpoint rather than as a function of the systems’ autopoietic processes. In the 
following paragraphs, we clarify the philosophical standpoints and interpretations 
fundamental to our view of autopoiesis.  
Systemic teleology: Autopoietic theory applied to systemic behaviour eschews 
traditional notions of systemic purpose. Systemic purpose, other than maintaining an 
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identity within a given niche or environment, is considered to be an attribution made 
by an observer. Any perceived purpose or function of a living system, other than the 
processes which constitute its identity maintenance, is considered as allopoietic, 
coincidental to, and emergent with, the system’s relationship to its environment. 
Epistemology: The epistemology of autopoiesis is based in studies of relatedness and 
includes the relationship of the observer to that of the observed phenomena (Capra 
1996: 40; Maturana & Varela 1980: 8-11; 1987: 211). The theoretical framework 
rejects the notion that knowledge is representational, that is, that ‘cognition is a 
representation of an independently existing world’ (Capra 1996: 263, original italics; 
Maturana & Varela 1980: 115-118). Rather than extracting knowledge from a pre-
given world, Maturana and Varela argue that people coordinate similarly experienced 
observations through language, and that ‘[t]he world everyone sees is not the world 
but a world, which we bring forth with others’ in the domain of language (1980: 49-
50; 1987: 211; 245).  
Ontology: The ontological assumptions of autopoiesis are based in a co-ontogenous 
view of human understanding. The theory assumes that people cannot have ultimate 
knowledge of the world due to their shared biological limitations as observers. Thus, 
“the world” is assumed to exist, but is not endowed with ultimately fixed, knowable 
features other than those to which members of human social systems, by way of their 
shared sensations, understandings, and perceptions of “the world”, have shared access 
(Maturana & Varela 1980: 98). The ontology of an autopoietic perspective is a 
synthesis of nominalist and realist standpoints based on linguistically mediated, 
biologically limited access to “the world”. 
Domain-specific phenomenology, logic, and language: Autopoiesis specifies first-
order cellular, second-order meta-cellular, and third-order social domains. Within 
these domains, specific phenomena emerge. Cognition is present in all domains. 
Within each domain, Maturana and Varela argue that a ‘universal logic’ is valid that 
specifically refers to ‘the relations possible between the unities that generate these 
domains’ (1980: 121). Thus, deeper traditional philosophical questions are confronted 
by autopoiesis. In particular, the paradoxes inherent in the ‘laws of thought’16 (Russell 
1912/1997: 72-73) are confronted. For instance, a thing may “be” in one’s “mind” –a 
descriptive domain (Maturana & Varela 1980: 123); whilst, concurrently, not “being” 
in “the world” – a physical domain extrinsic to the observer – and vice versa (1980: 
50-51).  
Within the social domain, Maturana and Varela specify four other phenomenological 
domains: The social domain in which social phenomena emerge; the communicative 
domain, in which coordinating behavioural phenomena emerges; the linguistic domain 
in which linguistic phenomena - behaviours that coordinate communicative 
behaviours - emerge; and the consensual domain(s) of language, in which descriptions 
about linguistic behaviour emerge. Maturana and Varela argue that, at this point, self-
consciousness emerges:  
[A] living system capable of being an observer can interact with those [observations] 
of its own descriptive states which are linguistic descriptions of itself. By doing so it 
generates the domain of self-linguistic descriptions within which it [the system] is an 
observer of itself as an observer, a process which can be necessarily repeated in an 
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endless manner. We call this the domain of self-observation and we consider that 
self-conscious behaviour is self-observing behaviour, that is, behaviour in the domain 
of self-observation. The observer as an observer necessarily always remains in a 
descriptive domain, that is, in a relative cognitive domain’ (1980: 121, our 
emphasis). 
Here, the self-referentiality that has vexed an acceptance of social autopoiesis 
becomes apparent (cf. Goudsmit 1992; Luhmann 1995; Mingers 1995a, 1995b, 1996; 
Zeleny 1980). However, if one accepts that communication is the basic processual 
element of human social systems, and focuses on the domain-specific dynamics of 
language from phenomenological and social perspectives, the theory becomes both 
manageable and viable as a social theory of communication (cf. Luhmann 1995). The 
notion that there is no “information” in communication is, perhaps, difficult to accept 
(Maturana & Varela 1980: 30-38; Mingers 1995b; 1996). Maturana and Varela view 
language as ‘orienting behaviour’ (1980: 30). We understand this to mean that 
language orients individuals to a particular theme: that is, for language to be 
communicative, it must orient participants to something about something in “the 
world”, including descriptions, or descriptions of descriptions, and so on. A 
consensual domain exists when a ‘specific system of communicative descriptions’ - a 
discourse community in the language of Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995), Lemke 
(1995), and Halliday (1978) - are used to orient communicative participants to themes 
about “the world” (Maturana & Varela 1980: 30-31).  
Cognition, information, and representationism: Artificial intelligence theorists 
posit an input-output, coding-decoding, memory-bank model of human cognition 
similar to that which a computer uses to access so-called information (cf. Pinker 1994, 
1997; Davies 1989). Maturana and Varela eschew such a notion of memory, 
cognition, and information. Capra (1996) translates Maturana and Varela on these 
points most transparently:  
A computer processes information, which means that it manipulates symbols based 
on certain rules. The symbols are distinct [discrete] elements fed into the computer 
from outside, and during the information processing there is no change in the 
structure of the machine… The nervous system [of a living system] works very 
differently… it interacts with its environment by continually modulating its structure, 
so that at any moment, its [entire] physical structure is a record of previous structural 
changes [that is, a history of triggered structural couplings PG]. The nervous system 
does not process information from the outside world but, on the contrary, brings 
forth a world in the process of cognition’ (1996: 267).  
From an autopoietic perspective, cognition is viewed as effective action in the context 
of constant, continual communion with an environment that is both specified by, and 
at the same time specifies, the cognitive domain of the individual. Varela, Thomson, 
and Rosch (1993) quote Merleau-Ponty to encapsulate the phenomenology of human 
cognition:  
The world is not an object I have in my possession … it is the natural setting of, and 
field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions … The world is inseparable 
from the subject … and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world 
which the subject itself specifies (Merleau-Ponty 1962, in Varela, Thomson, & 
Rosch 1993: 3-4). 
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Thus, we view socio-cognitive phenomena as mutually specified, reciprocally causal 
interactions between a system and the material and social environments in which it 
maintains its identity. 
Conclusion 
Because organisational communication, generally speaking, shapes itself as a 
discipline in response to trends in management theory, its theorists frequently neglect 
a fundamental function: defining what organisational communication is, or might be, 
as a discipline, other than to say that organisational communication studies ‘the nature 
of communication in organizations’ (Dixon 1996a: 1). Our proposal for an 
autopoietic, sociolinguistic study of organisational communication is a flexible, 
systemic, discursive approach to organisational communication that acknowledges its 
systemic and social nature, the constituting and constitutive role of language within 
the human social system, and the relationship of the social system to its environment 
and its constituents. Because specific analytical methods are beyond the scope of this 
paper, they will be discussed in a later paper.  
The teleological constraints of traditional organisational epistemologies have, we 
believe, hindered the study of organisational communication by inverting the 
appropriate focus of the discipline. To clarify, the practical and academic discipline of 
organisational communication, rather than focusing on how language shapes the 
identity of a social system and its constituents, has, to date, focused on how language 
might best be used to bring greater efficiency and effectiveness in achieving 
organisational purpose. Such a focus, while it may be considered prudent in a 
corporate context, delegitimises, and so renders invisible, the relationship between the 
social system and its social and physical environments. Furthermore, a focus on 
organisational purpose renders the autonomy of the social system’s constituents 
invisible under the generally unquestioned rubric of organisational purpose.  
An autopoietic view of communication within social systems carries with it an ethical 
and critical imperative: Social systems survive in niches that exist within social and 
physical environments. They also provide and create an environment which, itself, is 
continually recreated and defined through language in the social relations of the social 
system’s constituents, and in the system’s relationship with its social and physical 
environments. Therefore, communication within social systems should be considered 
in the context of the interdependent, linguistic relationships that the social system has 
with its environment and its constituents. The study of organisational communication 
as a facilitating prosthetic in the context of a perceived systemic purpose, or vision, 
renders the social system’s relationships with its environment, and the autonomy of its 
constituents, invisible and is, therefore, inadequate. The theoretical framework we 
posit here highlights the dialectical tension that arises between perceptions of the 
social system as a facilitating environment for its constituents, rather than as a 
purposive agent that acts solely within the context of its own perceived purpose. Most 
importantly, at least for the discipline of organisational communication, because our 
synthesis emphasises the dynamic, constituting role of language within the living 
social system, we believe, it better defines the focus and practice of organisational 
communication. 
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Notes 
1 Because the word organisation is central to the theory of autopoiesis and refers to the relatedness of 
systemic components, and to avoid confusion with the understanding of organisation as an enterprise, 
business, or some other human social system, hereinafter, we use the term social system to identify any 
social organisation. 
2 By congruent, Maturana and Varela do not invoke the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ which assumes that all 
things natural are ‘good’ (Pinker 1997: 50-52). ‘[C]ongruent structural changes’ in structurally coupled 
systems do not mean mutually beneficial changes, or even complementary changes, but changes 
sufficient to adapt to recurrent interaction with the environment and with other systems in the 
environment without the loss of identity (Maturana & Varela 1980: 107-111; 1987: 75-80). 
3 We take autonomy to mean self-describing. The literal Greek root of autonomy, that is auto (self) 
nomo (law) is generally understood to mean self-governing. We choose a nominalist (Grote 1872: 251-
252) interpretation of the literal translation: That is, that laws, themselves are descriptions (Grote 1872: 
226: 251-252; Concise Oxford Dictionary 1982: 688). Thus, the ability of an organisation to describe 
itself necessarily implies the ability of the system to be self-governing because the fundamental feature 
of systemic autonomy is the ability of a system to phenomenologically describe itself as a unity.  
4 Maturana and Varela do entertain the possibility that other species have language (1987: 214-215). 
However, we do not wish to enter into this debate for two reasons: Firstly, we are not convinced that 
humans can claim insight into the linguistic or cognitive domains of other species. Secondly, the 
argument is beyond the scope of this paper.  
5 By non-linear, complexity theorists mean iterative (!). 
6 Light particles. 
7 A general theory of biological self-organisation based in Aristotle’s theory of vitalism (Davies 1989: 
97; Grote 1872: 187).  
8 Krippendorf (1994) proposes autopoiesis as the basis for a theory of communication, but his thesis, for 
whatever reason, ignores most fundamental tenets of autopoiesis and is not considered here.  
9 Note that Maturana and Varela (1980), and Luhmann (1995), assert that there is no ‘information’ 
contained in communication, rather, they argue, communication orients socially consensual constituents 
to themes, and may be viewed as coordination of coordinating - or communicative - behaviours. This is 
problematic for traditional understandings of cognition, communication, and information in the context 
of information systems (IS) and artificial intelligence (AI) theorists who rely on a representationist or 
connectivist approach to understanding cognition (Cf. Pinker 1997; Mingers 1995). Put simply, the 
traditional approach of IS and AI theorists specifies that humans have hard-disk-like information 
storage somewhere in them which is independent of the environment. AI, IS, and autopoietic 
epistemologies represent fundamentally conflicting paradigms.  
10 Lemke (1995: 22) follows Bakhtin’s (1929/1986) definition of the word ‘intertextuality’: That is, the 
heteroglossia - the spectrum of thematic choices - from which a discourse community typically chooses 
in interpreting and describing its world, and the way the discourse community relates to the 
heteroglossia in which it is embedded.  
11 Because the word organisation is applied to such different phenomena both by Lemke, Maturana and 
Varela, and in a more general sense, we may, at some later time, need to choose different language for 
one or more of the meanings of the word organisation. However, Lemke’s and Maturana and Varela’s 
definitions of organisation are very similar and may be interchangeable.  
12 This may be construed as systemic allopoiesis and, therefore, teleologically incompatible with 
autopoietic theory. We assert that the societally perceived “goal” or purpose of a discourse community 
or social system, as specified by sociolinguistic theorists, (McKenna 1997: 191) is merely a function of 
the societal niche which the system specifies in conjunction with its environment and within which the 
system maintains its identity (Maturana & Varela 1987: 210-211).  
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13 Lemke’s view of ‘ecosocial system’ dynamics is a broadly-based synthesis of self-organising, 
complex systems theories. In our view, Lemke’s formulation of cultural dynamics is paradigmatically 
compatible with autopoiesis because he contextualises biological phenomena as being cognitively 
‘coupled’ with their social and physical environments (1998: 8, 13). Lemke is also careful to make the 
distinction between non-biological and biological systems. However, we see the autopoietic systems 
view as being specific and appropriate to viewing the role of language in a biologically based social 
system. Further, we emphasise the domain-specific phenomenology of autopoiesis that renders 
autocatalysis, quantum theory, dissipative structures, etc, largely irrelevant or inappropriate to the study 
of language in social systems. 
14 By semogenesis, Lemke follows Halliday’s (in press, quoted in Lemke 1998) definition: That is, that 
semogenesis is ‘a progressive semantic differentiation in the language system’ brought about by 
systemic context dependency’ (Lemke 1998: 15). See Lemke (1998) for a full discussion of his views 
on the dynamics of social systems. 
15 We differentiate between epistemological and cognitive issues because of the current dialectic 
between mainstream cognitive representationism (cf. Pinker, 1997; Mingers, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) and 
the view posited by Maturana and Varela that cognition is non-representational: That is, that humans do 
not possess a fixed mental “picture” of the world encoded by rule-based processes. 
16 1) The law of identity: ‘Whatever is, is’; 2) The law of contradiction: ‘Nothing can both be and not 
be’; and 3) The law of excluded middle: ‘Everything must either be or not be’ (Russell 1912/1997: 72).  
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